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Abstract. The paper analyses the railway accidents sources in the Czech Republic on the basis of
knowledge on complex system behaviour. It derives seven categories of sources of railway accidents.
The individual categories include the accident sources from the same field domain. These domains
are: technical related to rail traffic vehicles; technical related to rail infrastructure and railway station;
railway operation control – organizational causes; railway operation control – cyber causes; control of
rail traffic vehicles; attack on the train; domain legislative and other. The results show that for railway
traffic safety improvement, it is necessary to pay attention to all categories, and especially to these
that lead to organizational accidents origination.
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1. Introduction
Humans need infrastructures for their life quality and
development. Especially, at critical conditions the
infrastructures’ operations support the human sur-
vival. The traffic infrastructure in present dynamic
age has three basic tasks at critical conditions caused
by disasters occurrences, namely to ensure: the human
evacuation from aﬄicted region; the transposition of
response units to aﬄicted region; and interconnections
between aﬄicted region and its vicinity. Therefore,
its safety (the set of anthropogenic measures and ac-
tivities that improve the system security) is the goal
of human management and behaviour.
From the general view the railway system plays
very important role in terms of transportation in the
European area. The transportation mode is widely
used not only for middle and long-distances, but it has
also very important role in short distances between
small agglomerations and for the public transport in
cities. Therefore, the safety of railway system has
long-term tradition as well as railway operating itself
since twenties 19th century. It is very followed in the
Czech Republic that has very dense railway network
with 9458 km of rail track, including 1329 km of rail
track for the international transportation within the
European railway system.
Although the railway safety has the long tradition,
the number of requirements on safety and their depths
are increasing because the increase of population den-
sity and vulnerability of environ, in which the railway
system operates. Especially, in the European rail-
way system the requirements on interoperability are
very important [1]. Because the social phenomena
based on human intent were found as the significant
threat, the security requirements have been step by
step introduced into practice.
From the system viewpoint there are other influ-
encing aspects which affect the railway safety, e.g.
the interconnection of cyber and physical systems,
the human-machine interfaces and overall perceiving
and handling with such complex systems, i.e. socio-
technological (technical) systems [2]. The practice
shows that their violation is often the cause of serious
railway accidents, and therefore, we need to protect
the railway system against them.
The monitoring of railway system and the critical
assessment of previous railway accidents are necessary
for understanding the complicated nature of railway
system safety, for which reach there are necessary to
implement the protective, mitigating, response and
renovation measures.
Owing to complex structure of problem, it is also
needed to understand the railway system in terms
of integral safety that deals with systems of systems
(SoS) safety, because we also need to reduce losses
caused by the cascades effects or by phenomena that
are the consequences of interfaces between systems of
completely different nature, i.e. technological, cyber,
social, environmental etc.
The results of research described in [3] show the
causes of traffic accidents on railway and road that
belong to the technical domain and the human factor
domain, which is connected with drivers error. The
present work is only directed to railway system. Its
goal is to obtain the detail findings that can help to
improve the safety in the railway traffic, which is the
important part of critical infrastructure.
The next given results are based on the concept of
integral safety of complex system with type "system
of systems (SoS)" [2]. The main target is to reveal
real causes of railway accidents. The authors’ effort
is especially focused on the recognition of risks that
are connected with interdependences in the railway
traffic system. They are mainly concentrated to those
interdependences that are originators of organizing
accidents, i.e. accidents caused due to bad human
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decision or due to bad human management.
2. Risk and Safety
If we want to ensure the safety of any system, we need
to determine the sources of losses and damages (gen-
erally denoted by term "disasters") and to determine
the sizes of their destructive potentials. It means that
incident, accident and other similar phenomena are
the subcategories of category "disaster" [4]. In the risk
engineering we work with three fundamental terms:
• Danger marks the conditions of human system at
which the origin of harms on protected assets has
the high probability; it is almost sure that the harm
will origin [5], i.e. the term marks the rate of condi-
tions. It means that it goes on mark of possibility of
origin of harm, loss or damage of one or more assets.
The danger is predetermined by substance proper-
ties that are in facility, object or territory and by
properties of processes that are running in facility,
object or territory. It is immediate, if the course un-
controllably goes to the disaster origin that causes
the emergency situation; and it is creeping, if the
course goes to disaster origin inconspicuously and
without clear-cut precursors [5]. The danger for hu-
man means both, the big phenomena (e.g. natural
disasters, industrial accidents, environmental or so-
cial disasters) and the seemingly small phenomena
from daily life as slump of snow, icicle or roofing
from roof, rough pavement etc. [5].
• Hazard marks the disaster potential to cause the
harms, losses and damages on protected assets in
a given site that is prescriptively determined. It
goes on prescriptive measure of danger that is con-
nected with the given disaster. For the strategic
planning needs, the centennial disaster is often con-
sidered, i.e. the hazard is size of disaster that occurs
once in hundred years, or professionally exactly, the
disaster size that has return period 100 years; at
special buildings and facilities it is considered from
safety reasons the hazard determined by connected
with thousand years’ disaster or ten thousand years’
disaster [5].
• Risk connected with a given disaster is the proba-
ble size of damages, harms or losses on protected
assets that originate in given place at origin of dis-
aster with size of normatively determined hazard,
which is normalized to the certain territory unit or
number of individuals and the time unit [5]. The
difference between risk and danger is the following:
the danger is specific (it denotes the topical con-
ditions) and the risk is only expected opportunity.
The humans ensure the protection of human society
and populated territory against risks by the way
that for each disaster they determine the certain
size (so called design disaster). They only perform
the preventive measures so the possible risk size
may be acceptable. The problem arises if disasters
with size greater than design disaster occur, be-
cause great damages, harms and losses origin as the
consequence of failure of man-made technological
systems [2, 5–7].
From the practical reasons it is necessary to consider
that the entity risk connected with the given disaster
does not represent only the direct losses on assets but
also the indirect ones; the indirect losses are caused
by: delays or errors in response, cascades of failures
caused by synergic and cumulative effects, which are
caused by linkages and couplings among the assets;
and by domino effects.
Due to the entity structure its risk is the integral
risk that is expressed by following formula
R(H) =
[∑n
i=1Ai(H)Zi(H) +∑n
i=1
∫ T
0
∫
F (H,Ai, Pi, O, t)dSdt
]
∗ τ−1
where: H is the hazard connected with the considered
disaster; Ai are the values of assets, i = 1, 2, ..., n that
are considered in connection with complex technologi-
cal facility safety, where n is the number of monitored
assets; Zi are the vulnerabilities of assets taken under
account, i = 1, 2, ..., n; F is the loss function; Pi is the
occurrence probability of i-th asset damage – condi-
tional probability; O is the vulnerability of safeguard
measures; S is the size of followed territory/facility; t
is the time that is measured from the origin of harmful
phenomenon in facility; T is the time for which losses
arise; and τ is the return period for the given disaster
[2].
Because the loss function F form is not known, we
use for determination of total risk (i.e. the integral
risk) the scheme given in Figure 1 [2].
The problem is complicated by reality that the
world is in dynamic development, i.e. both, the entity
conditions and the risk sources are changing in time.
Moreover, there is necessary to respect that the risk
and safety are not complementary quantities –
it holds that the risk reduction leads to safety increase
but at the same risk value the safety can increase
if humans perform special measures or at their be-
haviour use special manners following from correct
safety culture [2].
Therefore, at solution of practical tasks connected
with both, the entity safety and the entity risk, it
is necessary to consider that risks are normal
and for the entity safety it is necessary to ap-
ply not only the risk prevention measures and activ-
ities determined on the basis of correct intent and
correct data and methods, but also: the safety culture
by which the human behaviour in the entity and its
vicinity is targeted to safety; and the tools that re-
duced losses and damages if some important disasters
occur. Therefore, it is necessary to prepare the quali-
fied response for important risks realizations, such as:
the risk management plans for both, the entity and
the entity vicinity for all relevant risks; the continuity
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Figure 1. Flowchart for determining the risks for
the strategic management of safety; A – assets and Z
losses, damages and harms to the assets; Description:
1 – the human lives and health, 2 – human security, 3
– property, 4 – the public welfare, 5 – the environment,
6 – infrastructures and technologies, P – private.
plans for survive of important complex technologi-
cal objects and facilities; and the operational crisis
plans for both, the complex technological objects and
facilities and their vicinities.
According to knowledge concentrated in [2], the risk
engineering uses the following principles:
• the risk is followed and considered during the given
system whole life cycle, i.e. at sitting, designing,
building, operation and putting out of operation,
and eventually at territory bringing in original con-
dition,
• the risk determination is directed to user’s demands
and to the level of provided services,
• the risk is determined according to the criticality of
impacts on facility processes, provided services and
on assets that are determined by public interest,
• the unacceptable risks are mitigated by tools ac-
cording to technical and organisational proposals,
by standardisation of operating procedures or by
automatable check-up.
The advanced risk engineering directed to human sys-
tem safety respects the co-existence of systems with
different nature (SoS), and so fulfils present demands
of humans [6]. To prepare groundwork it is necessary
to combine analytical methods with expert judgement
by which we remove vagueness in data. The problems
that we need to solve in this consequence consist in
acquisition of knowledge and in assignment "who is
expert"; the last mentioned problem was broadly dis-
cussed in world conference ESREL2011 [8]. For the
first problem solution we need systematically to mon-
itor the human system and obtained data to process
by qualified methods [9].
The process model for work with risks is shown
in Figure 2 [5]. The criterions determine the condi-
Figure 2. Process model of work with risks targeted
to safe entity.
tions at which the risk is acceptable, conditionally
acceptable or unacceptable. The aims in real case are
selected from further given possibilities: to reduce risk
to certain level; to secure the system, i.e. to ensure its
security; to ensure safe system, i.e. to ensure security
for system and its vicinity. The feedbacks are used
in case if the monitoring shows that the risk is unac-
ceptable; firstly, it is used the cheapest feedback 1; in
case of its failure the feedback 2 etc.; at huge harms
immediately it is used the feedback 4 that means the
change of concept of work with risks.
3. Criticality and safety
management
In followed context the criticality is directed to fail-
ures and hazards [10]. The infrastructure criticality
needs to be determined on the basis of analysis of
relevant and dangerous incidents and failures, losses
and damages caused by functionality loss, outer dis-
asters, mitigation measures, reactions and substances
in a given facility, releases, leakages or discharges of
substances (products’ pipelines) etc. The criticality
determines the condition at which the system does not
ensure expected functions in a required time, a site
and in a required quality. To criticality of each partial
infrastructure we can approach from two viewpoints,
teleological and systemic [8]. From the teleological
viewpoint it follows that the criticality is a result of
role and function of partial infrastructure in the soci-
ety. This concept enables to work with non-network
and non-technical objects and processes. Partial in-
frastructure criticality from the systemic viewpoint
is a result of its position in the system or of its link
to another partial infrastructure. From both ap-
proaches it follows that the partial infrastruc-
ture criticality also influences the system that
is a social partial infrastructure created by
public administration, business subjects, ed-
ucational and research institutions and civic
clubs.
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Adopting the findings from the systems system
safety management [10] the set of partial infrastruc-
tures in a region is critical one, if it is only capable to
ensure activities at which there is only ensured human
surviving in a given region. For this purpose, there
have been in the world performed the analyses of sec-
tors to which individual partial infrastructure belong
and they have been followed the dependences among
sectors, and the safety management then respect both,
the conditions for functionality of individual partial in-
frastructures and the conditions for functionality of set
of infrastructures; aggregated (critical) infrastructure.
The term "criticality" was firstly used in a connec-
tion with the nuclear reaction where it denoted the
threshold after which the spontaneous chain reaction
followed. In connection with partial infrastructures
and with critical infrastructure (set of infrastructures),
the criticality is the most competently expressed by
phrases:
(1.) Criticality is a relative measure of impacts of
frequently occurred defects and failures.
(2.) Criticality is expressed by conditions that de-
scribe a transition between quality differ conditions.
(3.) Criticality is a condition of extensive urgency.
From the given criticality definitions, it is possible to
derive that the criticality is a threshold value that
may be designed and that can relate to event, pro-
cess/function parameter, type of defects and resis-
tance.
The determination of criticality is consistently re-
lated to a size of impacts caused by loss of functionality
of each infrastructure on the society [10]. From this
reason, at the criticality determination, it is necessary
to consider:
(1.) Concentration of humans and assets (especially
protected ones).
(2.) Sectors of economy (sector analysis).
(3.) Types of mutual dependences among the partial
infrastructures/sectors:
(a) On which item the assets of given sector are
dependent?
(b) What is the mutual dependence of assets
among sectors?
(4.) Types of services for public:
(a) How long has been taken the renovation of
services furnishing?
(b) Which compensations/substitutes can be ac-
cessible and available?
(5.) Public confidence in the public administration
institutions:
(a) Can defect of assets/public services result in a
fall of moral of citizens, a loss of national prestige,
panic, rebellion or civic disorders?
(b) Can defect of assets induce some im-
pacts/changes in the environment?
The determination of criticality in service of territory
goes from the hazard assessment for disasters possible
in a given region, considering the vulnerability of
partial infrastructures in a given region, the mutual
interconnections of partial infrastructures in a given
region, i.e. theoretically the same principle as in
analysis and assessment of risks in a region, at which
several protected interests is considered. Therefore,
the criticality determination process is the following:
(1.) Characteristics of assets (there are considered
physical, cyber and human assets).
(2.) Determination of criticality (hazard analysis and
consideration of assets vulnerabilities in a given
site).
(3.) Assessment of impacts on assets (concentration
of humans and assets, economic impacts, mutual
dependences, reliability).
(4.) Assessment of consequences of losses, victims,
damages and harms of assets.
(5.) Determination of priorities according to the given
rules.
(6.) The criticality is mostly determined by scoring,
i.e. by decision making matrix.
The criticality matrix of infrastructure shows scal-
ing the infrastructure vulnerability vs. infrastructure
importance (i.e. its damage causes the infrastruc-
ture failure). For safe infrastructure operation there
are used the tools: for middle criticality assets the
continual monitoring and risk management plans for
important risks; and for high criticality assets the
operational crisis plans and continuity plans [2].
It is true that above described procedure shows that
assessment of infrastructure/technology/set of infras-
tructures according to two criteria, namely measure
of vulnerability and measure of importance of service
in a region is not a result of objective computation of
process analysis but rather result of subjective estima-
tions, that is only tolerable in case of determination
of basic frame. More complex it is the determination
of criticality for some process.
At scoring the vulnerability and importance of ser-
vice it is necessary according to [2] to consider follow-
ing items: duration of renovation of infrastructures
and technologies; impact of failure of infrastructures
and technologies on human lives and security; caused
detriment, harms and loses; impacts on environment;
and induced adverse situation.
In the frame of ensuring the human system security
and sustainable development it is necessary perma-
nently to perform the measures that reduce an in-
frastructure criticality in a region. By building the
new infrastructure it is necessary to ensure suitable
number and regional distribution of objects of im-
portant infrastructure that are sufficiently resistant
to expected disasters in a given region, and by that
systematically to reduce infrastructure criticality.
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Expenses for critical infrastructure are not only
costs for its design and building but they also include
costs for its operation, maintenance, repair and mod-
ernisation. Therefore, the risks connected with each
infrastructure must also include the risks from just
given domains and the region management must know
how to deal with them. It is necessary to assess the
risks from disasters that can be denoted as financial
market failure because with them it is connected fail-
ure of finances for maintenance, operation, repair and
modernisation of objects of critical infrastructure. It
is caused by the fact that infrastructure criticality
increases if not good maintenance and good repair are
performed (which cause the vulnerability increases).
Because nothing is out of defects, it must be pre-
pared the plan for renovation of each infrastructure,
namely critical one. This plan needs to be proactive,
properly assessed; it needs to contain transparently
managed risks and answers to questions as:
(1.) What to do?
(2.) How to do?
(3.) In which time interval?
(4.) Do not risks for other protected interests in
crease?
etc.
Risk reduction in the context of safety man-
agement covers several topics: safety of processes;
the protection of workers’ health and safety (safety
of work); and reducing the impacts on the environ-
ment. Therefore, in practice, it was introduced that
the analysis of the impacts of management on the
safety of the facility shall be carried out according
to the Reason model of organizational accident [11].
The causes of organizational accidents are in three
basic aspects: organizational processes; the conditions
which cause the origin of errors or infringements of
rules; and no solved problems, which permit the errors
and/or violation of regulations.
Safety management is increasingly focused on re-
silience due to increasing complexities and connectiv-
ity of real technological facilities. This is based on the
concept that it is increasingly difficult to identify all
the hazards and unwanted accidents, and therefore, to
avert and reduce the consequences of various disorders
it is important the resilience. Investigation of failures
and accidents of complex technological systems indi-
cate that these are often caused by a combination
of several improbable accidents and the capability of
their predictions means to avoid combinations that
have the potential to cause accidents, accompanied
by large losses, which should enhance the safety. The
procedures and tools are described in [2].
4. Data on railway system
criticality and accidents
The railway system including the trans-European
transport network corridors and also the local specific
rails creates the complex transportation infrastructure.
In many cases it goes on the critical infrastructure,
because the railway system ensures the state basic
functions for human survival in the territory, state
and may be also on the continent level at critical con-
ditions. The elements of critical infrastructure, there-
fore, need the special attention, study and approaches
for increasing their resilience, i.e. it is necessary to
ensure their robustness, durability and adaptability
with regard to the origin of non-acceptable events. In
other words, it means to secure the systems under
consideration in which the individual elements are
located.
Individual elements shall also to have inherent safety
so that they and their surrounding (i.e. public assets
in their vicinity) might not be endangered by their
imperfection and failure. Certain level of safety shall
be also provided the less important local elements of
systems with less importance, the location and na-
ture of which can cause at their failure the significant
problems to the whole system, and at huge failures
they could cause the losses on public assets (including
the human lives and health) in immediate or far off
surrounding [9]. By introducing the new technolo-
gies which are not well verified in practice, and by
increasing the system interdependences caused by in-
terface of cyber, material, energetic, economic, social
etc. technologies, the systems are becoming more com-
plex. It is the fact that the complexity influences the
system safety, because it leads to increasing number
of possible systems’ conditions, and also to the origin
of non-assessable emergent phenomena, i.e. phenom-
ena which occur at certain conditions suddenly and
unpredictably [2].
In work [12] the criticality rates for individual types
of transportation infrastructure in the Czech Republic
were judged by experts from the areas: transportation;
transportation management in the territory; supply
chains; public administration; and the Integrated Res-
cue System. The experts assessed 14 factors and the
result was determined by using the Multi-attribute
Utility Theory. The result showed that the rail trans-
port has very high criticality rate. Regarding to just
describe research results, it is necessary to trade-off
with risks very carefully and to use the advanced tools
of risk engineering.
For investigation of railway accidents, two databases
were compiled [13]. The first one was created for the
whole world by help of internet [14] with using the
passwords "rail disasters", "railway disasters", "rail
accidents" and "railway accidents", especially from the
sources [15–18]. The second one was created on the
basis of national data that are given in the database
of The Rail Safety Inspection from the period 2006 up
to 2015 [19]; it contains 204 special reports on railway
accidents in the Czech Republic and in some reports
the description of similar accidents that happen in
another sites since 2006 and were not often the object
of investigation of inspection.
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5. Methods used at data
processing
The data on railway traffic accidents in database [13]
are judged in the context of integral safety of railway
system, i.e. not only from the viewpoint of railway
system, but from the human security and development.
The data are processed by current statistic methods
and by special risk engineering procedures as the CBA,
separation of accidents into seven accident sources’
categories, determination of logic interconnections
among the accident sources and their expression by
fish-bone diagram [20].
6. Items important for safety
improvement of railway traffic
in the Czech Republic
Data summarizes in [13] show that the railway ac-
cidents have been reported since 1650. The first
described accident originated in Whickham, County
Durham, UK - two boys die when they are run down
by a wagon on a wooden coal tramway. The contin-
uous reports are after the accident in Philadelphia,
County Durham, UK on July 15, 1815 that was de-
scribed by words - thirteen or sixteen people, mainly
spectators, are killed and 40 are injured by the boiler
explosion of the experimental locomotive.
Comparison of data in [13] shows that the worst
train disaster in the rail history was caused by tsunami
on Sri Lanka at December 26, 2004 – the death of
over 1700 people. From the same source it follows
that the railway accidents often occur in India; the
biggest accident was in the State of Bihar in June 6,
1981, it died more than 800 people when passenger
train derailed when it had crossing the bridge over
the Bagmati River.
The huge consequences have the railway accidents of
freight trains shipping the hazardous substances. The
huge railway accidents with presence of hazardous
substances was on the January 6, 2005 in the US,
Graniteville, South Carolina at which 9 people died,
more than 250 people were injured when the freight
train collided head-on with a parked local freight train
near the Avondale Mills plant in Graniteville. 16
wagons (including a tank car that ruptured 90 tons of
chlorine gas into the air) derailed in the accident. The
US NTSB determined that the cause of the accident
was the failure of the local freight’s crew members to
realign the switch for mainline operations.
Very great accident of freight train was on the July
6, 2013 in Lac-MÃľganic, Quebec, Canada (Figure 3).
The freight train containing 72 tank cars of crude oil
runs away unattended and derails. Several wagons
explode, destroying over 30 buildings in the town’s
centre, roughly half of the downtown area, and requir-
ing the demolition of all but three of the remainder
of the buildings in the downtown area due to contam-
ination by petroleum from the train; these combine
to require the evacuation of 2,000 people, a third of
Figure 3. Consequences of freight train accident in
Lac-Méganic, Quebec, Canada on July 6, 2013 [19].
the town’s population. 42 are confirmed killed, along
with 5 missing and presumed dead, making this the
fourth-deadliest rail accident in Canadian history.
The results of detail study of railway accidents
with presence of hazardous substances are in [3]. The
analysis of consequences of railway accidents in the
Czech Republic given in [13] shows that there is only
considered the direct loses on humans and rail traffic
components. To the accidents’ costs there are not
included the costs on responses performed by the
Integrated Response System, the costs on renovation
and the costs for alternative traffic serviceability.
The sites of rail accidents in the Czech Republic
in the period 2006 up to 2015 are shown in Figure 4.
From this figure it follows that rail accidents occur
on all railways; mostly on the railways with high
frequency shipping. The main causes of accidents and
near-misses in the Czech Republic supplemented by
the accident causes from the world that are possible
in our country due to present situation (e.g. cyber-
attacks) were revealed in domains [21]:
• technical – related to rail traffic vehicles,
• technical – related to rail infrastructure and railway
station,
• railway operation control – organizational causes,
• railway operation control – cyber causes,
• control of rail traffic vehicles,
• attack on the train,
• legislative and other.
Founded technical causes related to rail vehicles (as
locomotive, coach, car, wagon, freight car) are the
following:
• errors in design or at construction of traffic vehicle
(wrong wagon or locomotive construction from the
stability viewpoint, inappropriate location of fuel
tank or power conductor at a terminal block in the
locomotive – possibility of short circuit etc.),
• wrong maintenance of locomotive or wagons,
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Figure 4. Places of railway incidents in the Czech
Republic.
• wrongly performed technical overhaul of traffic ve-
hicle,
• wrongly performed the repair of rail traffic vehi-
cle (e.g. brake systems, mechanical parts of brake
systems, mainly in the case of car hand brake),
• wrongly loaded wagons,
• wrongly closed wagon doors,
• sudden technical fault of locomotive or some of
wagons (damage of axle bearing, engine broken,
traction interruption, direction controller out of op-
eration, or failure of another crucial device, outage
of air-conditioning etc.),
• fuel shortages or power outage,
• failure of technical equipment of locomotive control
system (broking the speedometer, outage of radio
connection with control centre (dispatching) etc.),
• malfunction of redundant system when it is needed.
Founded technical causes related to rail infrastructure
and railway station are the following:
• siting the railroad in the territory (steeper gradient,
insufficient load capacity of rail track foundation,
sharp rail swerve, a lot of unprotected crossings
with roads or field roads, tall and lush vegetation
caused the decrease of visibility etc.),
• construction errors at the railway station design
and building (too short operating space, sitting the
rails in the direction in which the tall buildings
are, which decreases the view of engine-driver and
switchmen (shunter operator) in the case of change
of position of rail vehicle, headwind etc.),
• rail track condition (error in construction, disorder
in the railway station area, wrong maintenance –
ruggedness, ice, snow, rail track drift, cracked rail
switch, unanchored rail track to sleepers etc.),
• missing the periodic overhauls of rail tracks,
• wrongly performed technical overhaul of rail tracks
(no detection of cracked rail switch),
• failure of early repair execution of identified relevant
faults on the rail track or on signalling equipment,
• missing the signalling equipment or it has insuffi-
cient power,
• sudden technical failure of operation control devices
(insufficient maintenance, fault or failure of technical
equipment of control system in operation control
centre, etc.),
• equipment layout for service of rail vehicles (refu-
elling, loading and unloading of goods, entrance
and exit of passengers etc.),
• physical damaging the railway station or rail tracks
(war, robbery attack, terrorist attack, vandalisms
etc.),
• siting the train to the wrong rail,
• obstacles on the rail tracks,
• insufficient radio equipment of railway station,
• deficit of knowledge and experience of railway sta-
tion service (e.g. worker who operates the move-
ment of rail vehicles on rail tracks in railway area
etc.),
• out of function of warning system at railway station
signalling the minimal safe distance between two
trains that are on one rail track.
Founded causes related to railway operation control
the – organizational causes are the following:
• wrong setting up the train route,
• failure of start-up of operation of crossbars, lights
or sound signals before train arrival to crossing the
rail tracks with road or field road,
• keeping the obstacles on the rail tracks,
• insufficient identification of rail track,
• insufficient identification of crossing the rail track
with road or field road,
• guiding the train approaching to railway station on
the incorrect rail track (train collisions, derailment
etc.),
• bad decision of train dispatcher (wrong evaluation of
report from police and stopping the train operation
at another rail track than at this on which the
obstacles were occurred,
• non-passing the information on fire to the engine-
drivers of relevant trains,
• wrong consideration of meteorological conditions
(wrong information to engine-driver),
• dispatching the wrong instructions to trains owing
to the control system failure in dispatcher workplace
(e.g. as a consequence of electricity outage, the PC
outage etc.),
• dispatching the wrong instructions to trains owing
to the dispatcher (controller) error or ignorance,
• chaos at operation control/dispatcher work-
place/room (wrong information to engine-drivers,
information delay etc.),
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• deficiency in railway station staff (train collisions
etc.),
• wrong maintenance or wrong platform lighting,
• wrong communication between train dispatchers at
setting up the train routes,
• insecurity of movement of shunted vehicle,
• shunters are not furnished by a red signal lighting,
• insufficient training the shunters,
• insecurity of control at crossing the rail track with
road or field road at train shunting,
• error of railway station staff (at train guidance,
cleaning the railway station and rail tracks, rail
station and rail tracks maintenance etc.),
• wrong communication between the operation con-
trol centre and companies which repair the rail
tracks,
• wrongly distributed responsibilities at the operation
control centre,
• insufficient communication among the engine-
drivers in service area,
• insufficient knowledge and experiences of staff in
the operation control centre,
• absence of instructions for support to engine-drivers
who occur in unexpected emergency up to critical
conditions.
Founded causes related to railway operation control –
cyber causes are the following:
• distortion of data from monitoring – the operation
data acquisition system (false information to the
engine-drivers and from engine-drivers, chaos at
operation control centre etc.),
• false software (it does not consider all possible vari-
ants of possible operational conditions, from which
it follows the false instructions to engine-drivers
and other staff),
• insufficient hardware (wrong data processing and
evaluation, dispatching the false instruction to
engine-drivers in operation owing to PC failure,
delay of reports etc.),
• hacking attack to control centre of dispatch work-
place.
Founded causes related to control of rail traffic vehicles
are the following:
• error of engine-driver at train control – e.g. for-
biddance of train drive behind the semaphore with
signal forbidding the train drive (e.g. signal at dan-
ger), non-keeping the view conditions at bad visi-
bility (owing to health conditions, tiredness, stress,
wrong information from the rail operation control
centre, failure of critical equipment of locomotive or
other vehicle due to wrong maintenance, incorrect
evaluation of situation as reduced speed signalling
owing to effort to correct the disharmony with the
time table, bump to obstacle on the rail track, turn
off the functional device instead of faulty one – exit
and entrance to the station, derailment, non-use of
wedge at train stop at train shunting etc.),
• engine-driver fault at assessment of meteorological
conditions (hoar, snow drifts, obstacles on the rail
track etc.),
• engine-river fault at unexpected conditions occur-
rence (owing to insufficient preparation for coping
with emergency conditions – storm, reduced visibil-
ity etc.),
• engine-drive fault at locomotive preparation for
drive (bad instruction studying before the drive – e.
g. regarding to freight, wrong setting the speedome-
ter, false adjusted input data for the drive, e. g. at
expensive goods shipping etc.),
• engine-driver fault at radio control,
• wrong co-operation of engine-driver, conductor and
other train staff,
• fault of engine-driver at reporting (using the false
train code – short distance between trains),
• fire or smoke in locomotive, passenger cars, in cargo
wagons, or the engine fire,
• bad intent of engine-driver (change of speed, non-
responding to instructions from the control – dis-
patcher – centre or from surrounding trains, etc.),
• engine-driver ignorance of procedures of train con-
trol (at unexpected emergency up to critical situa-
tions – e.g. obstacle on the rail track etc.).
Founded attacks on the train are the following:
• rocket/missile from another train or buildings lying
outside the track (throwing the stones and other
heavy objects from the bridge above the rail track
on the train etc.)
• intent damage of rail track or track foundation,
• illegal act in the train,
• bad dispatcher intent,
• bad intent of railway station service staff (worker
guiding the movement of train at the railway sta-
tion),
• train collision with aircraft or another flying object.
Founded legislative and other causes are the following:
• lack of regulations which prevent the wrong track
setting at railway station,
• missing the precise instructions for performance
of maintenance of train body, rail tracks, track
foundation and rail track vicinity,
• missing the texts of intelligible and precise instruc-
tions for communication between engine-driver and
control operation centre,
• the absence of a uniform system of marking the
railway crossings with roads and field roads serving
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Figure 5. Causes of railway accidents in the Czech
Republic.
to their identification from the viewpoint of rail and
road topologies, enabling the direct designation and
informing,
• inappropriate behaviour of passengers at boarding,
train drive or exit from train (non-observing the
instructions, indiscipline, poor care on children be-
haviour at the train),
• soggy or else damaged rail track foundation,
• behaviour of road vehicle drivers on the road and rail
level crossing (non-respecting the traffic symbols,
sound signals or obstructions).
The fish-bone diagram showing the main categories of
railway accident causes is shown in Figure 5. It only
contains six main categories of causes. The diagram
helps the specialists and the paper readers to in-depth
insight into the problem of railway accidents. We see
the causes arranged according to affinity, which en-
ables to look up the possible actions, i.e. the measures
for railway system safety improvement, for the whole
groups of accident causes.
Because some accident causes repeat, it is necessary
to prepare quality technical and organisational mea-
sures. Sometimes, the relative simple measures can
avert the accidents; the examples belonging to this
category are for example the following:
• the many railway accidents are on the crossing the
rail track with road or field road where safety is
only ensured by the symbol on the road "cautionary
cross",
• the huge material losses are at accidents of freight
trains with expensive goods or with hazardous sub-
stances,
• all rail track crossings with field routes are not
denoted by warning symbols,
• rail track crossings with routes are not clearly iden-
tified,
• many works do not respect simple rule "the respon-
sible person for order is the person who gives it, and
the responsible person for order implementation is
the person, who has to carry out it".
Therefore, it is necessary to pay attention to freight
trains, the check-up from the side of rail workers at
train loading seems very necessary – for this purpose
the special check lists are necessary to prepare. For
communication at critical situations it is necessary
to prepare the texts of reports that are clear, concise
and comprehensible. There are necessary rules for
maintenance, regular technical overhauls of rail tracks
etc.
Generally, it is necessary to take into account that
accidents can occur and for these cases to prepare both,
the train personnel, especially the engine-drivers and
the railway stations personal, especially those who set
up the train rotes.
Because each train accident means the reduction
of traffic service and also costs for responses that are
performed by the Integrated Rescue System that is
paid from the public sources, the state administration
needs to prepare legislative for improvement the safety
in rail sector.
7. Conclusion
The railway accidents in the Czech Republic were
divided into seven categories according to the acci-
dent sources. Individual categories have the same
domain of accident sources – technical – related to
rail traffic vehicles; technical – related to rail infras-
tructure and railway station; railway operation control
– organizational causes; railway operation control – cy-
ber causes; control of rail traffic vehicles; attack on
the train; legislative and other. For railway traffic
safety improvement, it is necessary to pay attention
to all categories and especially to this that lead to
organizational accidents.
The critical analysis of railway accidents revealed
that some of accident causes often repeat, e.g. the
insufficient maintenance, low-class overhauls and ren-
ovation. They have immediate cause that is not the
root cause of such accident type; the root cause is
in poor safety culture in the sector and in deficits in
training.
Our research will continue in preparation of real
tools for individual sectors of followed domain such
as check lists, risk management plans and operational
crisis plans for great railway stations, especially those
in which the hazardous substances in great amount
are present.
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